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Trade-related characteristics have only been recently started to be
included in empirical studies analysing the determinants of the ﬁnan-
cial constraints faced by ﬁrms. A result broadly shared by these stud-
ies is that exporting ﬁrms tend to be those less ﬁnancially constrained.
In this paper we test this result using panel data built up from quar-
terly balance sheet information for 74 Argentinean big ﬁrms covering
the years of the currency board regime (1992-2001). We estimate an
investment equation splitting up the sample between exporters and
non-exporters. Using three alternative econometric models (random
eﬀects, ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumental variables) we ﬁnd that, contrary
to what is commonly stressed in the literature, exporting ﬁrms are the
ones facing larger ﬁnancial constraints on investment. We propose an
explanation for this original result based on the currency appreciation
that follows ﬁnancial liberalisation processes in emerging countries,
particularly in Argentina, which triggers a proﬁt squeeze phenomenon
for exportable ﬁrms, reducing their investment capacity.
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11 Introduction
A large empirical literature has been developed in the past years concerning
ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrms’ investment behaviour. Some studies consider
export capacity as a factor that helps overcoming ﬁnancial constraints, as
this leads, among other things, to greater creditworthiness, whereas non-
exporting ﬁrms are the ones unable to completely ﬁnance their projected in-
vestment (Ganesh-Kumar, Sen & Vaidya 2001, Gelos & Werner 2002, Tornell
& Westermann 2002, Tornell & Westermann 2003). The economic rationale
underlying these results is that: (1) foreign exchange revenues constitute a
better collateral to borrow in international markets (Tornell & Westermann
2003); (2) selling in international markets is considered as a sign of eﬃciency
and competitiveness (Ganesh-Kumar et al. 2001), and (3) external markets
allow exporting ﬁrms to achieve economies of scale and increase sales and
proﬁts.
In this paper we aim to test the hypothesis that ﬁrms’ characteristics re-
lated to trade are a determinant of ﬁnancial constraints in Argentina. Thus,
we estimate an investment equation using a panel database built up on quar-
terly balance sheet information for 74 Argentinean big ﬁrms listed in Buenos
Aires Stock Market, covering the 1992-2001 period. Using three alternative
econometric techniques: ﬁxed eﬀects, random eﬀects and instrumental vari-
ables, we obtain an original result: in Argentina, exporting ﬁrms are the ones
facing larger ﬁnancial constraints.
Having in mind the Argentinean economy, we can think about some clues
to understand this puzzling result, where exchange rates appreciation is at the
very heart of the explanation. As a matter of fact, the new macroeconomic
context of the 1990s drew large capital inﬂows, what combined with a price
stabilization programme based on ﬁxed exchange rate, provoked currency
appreciation as occurred in other economies (Taylor 1998). This change in
relative prices initiated a proﬁt squeeze process for exportable ﬁrms and
weakened their balance sheet (diminishing both sales and assets accounts).
As a consequence, not only it reduced internal sources of ﬁnance but also
increased the probability of bankruptcy, prompting banks to be extremely
2cautious when granting loans to these ﬁrms.
Our study is inscribed within a large empirical literature testing the ex-
istence of ﬁnancial constraints to investment at the ﬁrm level1, whose com-
mon outcome is that investment tends to be largely ﬁnanced with internal
resources, i.e. cash ﬂow is a signiﬁcant variable to explain ﬁrms’ invest-
ment levels. As the literature has been extended to developing countries2,
researchers have been adding several variables -both at macro and micro
levels-to better account for developing countries’ speciﬁcities. These new
variables refer to whether the ﬁrm has been recently privatised, its debt
currency denomination, liberalisation dummy variables, etc. Nonetheless, all
these works remain quite close to the original empirical approach: testing the
existence of ﬁnancial constraint for ﬁrms belonging to one particular group.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the econometric
model and estimation techniques to be used. In section 3, we describe the
database and some descriptive statistics, and in section 4 we discuss our
results. In section 5 we propose some explanations of why exporting ﬁrms
tend to be the ones facing lager ﬁnancial constraints, and propose future
directions for our research. In section 6 we conclude.
2 Econometric model and method of estima-
tion
2.1 Investment equation
Theoretically, if markets were complete and there was no radical uncertainty
about the future, the amount of external ﬁnance a ﬁrm could ﬁnd would be
related to the actualised value of its future proﬁts and it would not be any
link between ﬁnancial markets and the investment behaviour of ﬁrms (i.e.
1See Athey & Fazzari (1987), Devereux & Schiantarelli (1989), Fazzari & Mott (1986-
7), Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, S. & Poterba (1988), Fazzari & Peterson (1993), Gertler &
Hubbard (1989), Gertler & Gilchrist (1994), Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1995), Ndikumana
(1999), Mairesse, Mulkay & Hall (2001), among others.
2See Athey & Laumas (1994), Hermes & Lensink (1998), Gallego & Loayza (2000),
Ganesh-Kumar et al. (2001), Fanelli, Bebczuk & Pradelli (2002), Gelos & Werner (2002).
3there would not any diﬀerence in opportunity cost of using internal or exter-
nal ﬁnance). Therefore, internal source of ﬁnance would not play any role
when ﬁrms bring their investment projects, à la Modigliani-Miller. However,
markets are not perfect, uncertainty about the future is predominant and
thus some ﬁrms cannot reach the desired level of external ﬁnance and ﬁnd
themselves limited to invest - i.e. ﬁrms’ investment is ﬁnancially constrained
when a windfall increase in the supply of internal funds "results in a higher
level of investment spending" (Bond & Van Reenen 2003, page 58). Actually,
market failures have been incorporated in an orthodox framework, by intro-
ducing asymmetric information in the borrower-lender relationship (Stiglitz
& Weiss 1981).
From an empirical point of view, as just noted in the introduction, an
abundant literature has been developed in order to test the existence of
ﬁnancial constraints limiting ﬁrms’ investment behaviour. Following this
empirical work, we propose an investment equation, using cash ﬂow variable
as a measure of internal sources of ﬁnance. It is worth noting that cash ﬂow
is representing ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints in a double sense, directly and
indirectly. On the one hand, it is a genuine source of liquidity to invest after
dividends have been distributed. On the other hand, we consider this variable
as a proxy of ﬁrm’s net worth 3 (i.e. ﬁrm collateral), which limits the amount
of external ﬁnance a ﬁrm can have access to (Bernanke & Gertler 1989). A
signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient for this variable should be interpreted as
a signal of ﬁnancial constraints.
A common criticism to the extended use of cash ﬂow as the key variable to
test the presence of ﬁnancial constraint is that cash ﬂow can also represent the
future investment opportunities.4 To overcome this diﬃculty, most empirical
3Even if cash ﬂow is not the ideal proxy for variation in net worth, as Hubbard (1998)
: page 203) points out, it is the better proxy available for a large number of ﬁrms.
4Kaplan & Zingales (1997) criticize Fazzari et al. (1988) seminal work. They argue that
conclusions about cash ﬂow-investment sensitivities might be spureous. This is because,
on the one hand, Tobin’s Q may be a weak proxy of investment opportunities and, on
the other hand, because inﬂuencial outliers might biais the result, particularly regarding
most indebted ﬁrms. To overcome these problems we use sales to control for investment
opportunities and we exclude outliers from the database. To follow this debate Fazzari
et al. (1988), Kaplan & Zingales (1997), Fazzari, Hubbard & Peterson (2000), Kaplan &
Zingales (2000).
4studies divide the sample of ﬁrms’ in two sub-samples, and consider one of
them to be, at least theoretically, more constrained. Given that there is no
reason a priori to think that the cash ﬂow considered as a sign of future
proﬁtability would have any diﬀerential impact in the sub-samples, a higher
coeﬃcient should then conﬁrm a situation of ﬁnancial constraint.
The most common (but not the only) feature to partition the sample is
size. It is often argued that smaller ﬁrms are in theory more ﬁnancially con-
strained as they face greater problems of asymmetric information and agency
costs or, in a more Keynesian vein, they are exposed to greater radical un-
certainty. In both cases, ﬁrms’ net worth determines external ﬁnance, in
particular for negotiating the level and the repayment conditions of the bor-
rowed amount. Since our database contains only large ﬁrms, we aim to test
other feature than size that would limit investment decisions in Argentina.
Therefore, having all ﬁrms similar size and following (Ganesh-Kumar et al.
2001, Gelos & Werner 2002, Tornell & Westermann 2002, Tornell & West-
ermann 2003), we argue that trade-related characteristics of ﬁrms are key
elements to identify which ﬁrms are facing ﬁnancial constraints.5
In our investment equation, cash ﬂow coeﬃcients should be signiﬁcant
and, according to those authors, if N ﬁrms are likely to face larger ﬁnancial
constraints than ﬁrms from sector T, we should expect αcfn to be higher than
αcft (cash ﬂow variable interacted with N and T dummies respectively).
Other variables have been proposed to control the eﬀect of future prof-
itability on cash ﬂows. Tobin’s Q is one of the most commonly used, since
it associates ﬁrm’s stock-market value with its capital stock value, and thus
summarises market anticipations of proﬁtable investment opportunities of
ﬁrms. Thus, αq is expected to be signiﬁcant and positive.
However, Q models have been largely criticised, particularly in emerging
countries where stock indexes are often highly volatile and rarely represent
ﬁrms’ future revenues. Indeed, a central problem of Tobin’s Q lies on the
non equality between Average Q and Marginal Q, especially when ﬁnancial
5It is worth noting that Gelos & Werner (2002) and Ganesh-Kumar et al. (2001), only
consider ﬁrms from the tradable manufacturing sector, whereas our database considers
both, tradable and non-tradable ﬁrms.
5market imperfections are present (Chirinko 1993, Hubbard 1998) and, as
Schiantarelli (1996) points out, when "stock markets are not eﬃcient and
stock prices are driven by fads and fashions".
Another proxy for future proﬁtability can be given by the level of ﬁrms’
sales (Chirinko 1993, Fanelli et al. 2002). Sales variables -in level or variation-
are thus added to the investment equation and are considered to explain the
past and potential future performance of a ﬁrm, as sales accelerator type
models suggest: higher levels of sales encourage ﬁrms to increase capital
goods demand to boost their production capacity in order to meet an enlarged
demand (Fazzari & Mott 1986-7, Athey & Fazzari 1987, Fazzari et al. 1988,
Ganesh-Kumar et al. 2001, Arza 2003).
Fazzari & Peterson (1993) also underline the role of working capital in
ﬁnancial constraint empirical analysis. According to the authors, invest-
ment projects are generally rather expensive and they require some conti-
nuity across time. As a consequence, when facing a negative shock that
diminishes internal ﬁnancial resources, a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm would
adjust its working capital in order to keep on going its designed investment
with minimal stability. Putting it diﬀerently, working capital needs to fulﬁl
a "buﬀer" function to cope with cash ﬂow ﬂuctuations (Fazzari & Peterson
1993). We thus expect αwk to be signiﬁcant and negative.
The last control variable is related to ﬁrms’ indebtedness proﬁle. This
leverage eﬀect is actually twofold. On the one hand, a higher indebtedness
ratio can be considered as a signal of an improved capacity to ﬁnance in-
vestment, and in this case it will be a positive relation between debt and
investment. On the other hand, once ﬁrms reach certain threshold, an in-
crease of the indebtedness ratio will have negative consequences, provided
that it triggers higher external ﬁnance costs due to balance-sheet deterio-
ration (Bernanke & Gertler 1989). Therefore, the possibility of an inverted
U-shaped debt curve is captured by two variables: the debt to capital stock
ratio and its square. So αd and αd2 should be signiﬁcant, with positive and
negative signs respectively.
For the econometric estimation we use a twofold error term model: 6
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(1)
ui,t = ni + εe,t
where ni is the ﬁrm speciﬁc part of error term and εe,t is the unsystematic
error.
K = Physical Stock (Machinery and Intangible Assets)
I = Gross Investment: Kt−1 - Kt + Depreciation
CF = Cash Flow = Operating Earnings + Depreciation
Q = Tobin’s Q = Lag of Firm Value/ Kt−1
S = Total Sales
WK = Working Capital (Current Assets - Current Liabilities)
D = Total Debt (Current and non Current Liabilities)
Size = Log Total Assets
Y earD = Year Dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks
T = Exportable sectors
N = Non-Exportable sectors
2.1.1 Robustness
Note that the non-exportable sector is less represented in our sample for the
ﬁrst years (cf. section 3.1). Therefore, in order to gain in robustness, we
propose two alternative investment equations to be estimated for exportable
sector ﬁrms, which are largely represented along the period of study.
Equation 2 is the same as equation 1 but without the sample partition,
whereas in equation 3, following Devereux & Schiantarelli (1989), we add
previous period.
7liquid assets7 in a investment equation from a Q model framework. According
to these authors, liquid assets are likely to represent an easily collateralisable
asset and thus a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient will be an additional
proof of ﬁnancial constraints, given that liquid assets (taken as a collateral)
would limit external ﬁnance capacity to invest (Devereux & Schiantarelli
1989, Ganesh-Kumar et al. 2001, Arza 2003). By contrast, in a perfect market
world, there would not be any relation between investment and liquid assets,











































+ αyY earDt + ui,t
(3)
ui,t = ni + εe,t
where, ni is the ﬁrm speciﬁc part of error term and εe,t is the unsystematic
error.
Summarising, our econometric study estimates alternative investment
equations suggested by the empirical literature to test the presence of ﬁnan-
cial constraints aﬀecting exportable ﬁrms, which in all cases will be mainly
represented by cash ﬂow coeﬃcients being signiﬁcant and positive.
2.2 Estimation method
We estimate the investment equation using three alternative econometric
models: the random eﬀects model (RE-GLS), within ﬁxed eﬀects model
7Liquid Assets variable (LA) represents cash plus short-term commercial papers.
8(FEW) and instrumental variables (IV). Obtaining good estimators8 requires
testing several hypotheses about the regressors and the error term. For in-
stance, if we assume that the ﬁrm speciﬁc term in error term ni is randomly
distributed -i.e. it is not correlated with explicative variables in the invest-
ment equation-, then the random eﬀect model will give estimators that are
both consistent and eﬃcient.
By contrast, if the ﬁrm-speciﬁc error term is correlated with any of the
independent variables, one needs to use ﬁxed eﬀect models to estimate the
investment equation. The Hausman test helps us to chose between RE and
FEW estimations. Rejecting the Hausman test imply that the FE model
provides regressors with the right properties.9
In addition, endogeneity problems10 might be present. This would be the
case when the independent and dependent variables are simultaneously de-
termined or when there is double causality or feedback between them. In our
equation for example, investment and working capital might be simultane-
ously determined or, as well, investment may have an impact on future cash
ﬂow of ﬁrms. In such a case, good estimators ask for using the instrumental
variable model (IV), and this requires ﬁnding appropriate instruments that
are highly correlated with the independent variables but not with the depen-
dent one -in our equation: variables correlated to the cash ﬂow but not to
ﬁrms’ investment.11
Choosing right instrumental variables is a complex task and an accurate
instrumentalisation is essential to obtain convergent estimators. Sargan test
allows verifying a correct choice of instruments. If we reject the test, IV
model is the one properly speciﬁed.
8That means estimators consistent (without bias) and eﬃcient (minimal variance).
9It is worth noting that FE models are preferable in our empirical work, since they
correct for potential problems that could appear when working with unbalanced panel
data (Green 2003, Sevestre 2002).
10Diﬀerent models have been proposed to deal with endogeneity problems: Arellano &
Bond (1991) and Anderson & Hsiao (1981). Our IV estimation follows the last one.
11According to whether we choose RE or FE models, our instrumental variables model
will be IVRE or IVFE correspondingly. As usual, the instrumentalisation is carried out
adding lags of independent variables, sectoral dummies and all other independent variables
of the investment equation. In our case, instrumental variables can be to ﬁve lags what is
reasonable given that we work with quarterly data.
93 Data sample and summary statistics
3.1 Database
We work with an unbalanced panel with information from 74 large ﬁrms
covering 40 consecutive quarters (1992q1-2001q4), the period when Argentina
implemented a currency board. The information in the database is that of the
balance sheets of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed in Buenos Aires’ Stock Exchange
-Bolsa de Valores de Buenos Aires- complemented with additional balance-
sheet information published by the ﬁrms themselves.12
Our sample classiﬁcation between exportable and non-exportable ﬁrms is
determined by whether a ﬁrm commercialises its products in foreign markets.
Since balance sheets in Argentina do not directly include exports informa-
tion but only the sector activity of each ﬁrm, we split up the sample between
tradable and non-tradable. Tradable sectors basically refer to manufacturing
and agricultural production, while non-tradable sectors cluster real services
and construction13. However, in the particular case of our database, tradable
ﬁrms are easily associated with exportable since we work with large quoted
ﬁrms, which are those more likely to be exporter. We actually conﬁrm the
validity of this statement in additional sources of information (we checked it
using the ECT -Encuesta Nacional sobre la Conducta Tecnológica de las Em-
presas Industriales Argentinas - INDEC- and ﬁrms’ published information,
as well.
It is worth noting that tradable ﬁrms are over-represented in the sample,
partly due to our deliberate exclusion of ﬁnancial and banking institutions
since we are not focusing our study in those kind of ﬁrms. However, the
diﬀerence between the two groups diminishes with time (cf. appendix, table
7).
12According to our knowledge, our database is the best source of information for tradable
and non-tradable ﬁrms since it contains a large proportion of total listed ﬁrms in domestic
stock market (107 ﬁrms).
13The exact classiﬁcation is as follows. Tradable Sectors are: agricultural product, oil ex-
traction and mining, food production and tobacco, textile industry and shoes production,
wood and paper; chemistry and plastic, minerals and metals, still and iron, machinery,
automobile industry. Non-tradable sectors: services; gas electricity and water; construc-
tion.
10The empirical analysis is carried out excluding outliers (at 1%) for key
variables: investment, cash ﬂow, debt, sales and working capital, whereas all
data is deﬂated using the producer price index (1993 $), published by the
Argentinean Ministry of Finance.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that although our sample of ﬁrms
is not representative of the entire population of Argentinean enterprises, we
claim that if the large ﬁrms quoted in the stock market are ﬁnancially con-
strained, other ﬁrms would likely suﬀer similar constraints.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 summarises some characteristics of the ﬁrms from the sample used
in our econometric work. In the ﬁrst place, we can see that the proﬁt rate of
exportable sectors, which is deﬁned as the cash ﬂow to capital stock ratio, is
larger than that of non-exportable ﬁrms; whereas there are no signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the groups in relation to capital accumulation (investment
to capital stock ratio). Secondly, exportable ﬁrms show a weaker indebted-
ness proﬁle: not only they have larger debt to capital stock ratios but also
their debts tend to be dominated by short-term liabilities (short-term debt
over total liabilities). Finally, both sales and working capital to capital stock
ratios are higher in non-exportable ﬁrms.
Figures 1 to 6 show time-series for some key variables (cf. appendix). As
we can see, non-exportable sectors obtained a higher proﬁt rate all through
the decade (ﬁgure 1). In terms of investment behaviour, the ﬁgures show that
ﬁrms from the exportable sector outperformed non-exportable ﬁrms during
the ﬁrst years of analysis, although this diﬀerence disappeared in the ﬁnal
years when both groups had very low values of capital accumulation (ﬁgure
2).
We consider ﬁrms’ indebtness proﬁle. In ﬁgure 3 we look at a conventional
measure of ﬁrm’s leverage, such as total debt over total assets. The ﬁgure
shows that this ratio increased in both exportable and non-exportable ﬁrms,
being the leverage slightly larger in non-exportable ﬁrms. Our descriptive
statistics show other interesting results. On the one hand, we observe in
11ﬁgure 4 that exportable ﬁrms were never able to overcome their short-term
liability proﬁle. On the other hand, empirical information suggest that the
non-exportable sector had greater access to ﬁnancial markets: not only the
share of ﬁnancial debt -which include corporate bonds- in total debt grew
more in this ﬁrms than in exportable ﬁrms (ﬁgure 5), but also non-exportable
ﬁrms obtained debt with longer term maturity (ﬁgure 6).
In the end, it is interesting to note that if working capital acts as a buﬀer
for investment in ﬁxed capital, the within-ﬁrm variance of the ﬁrst variable
should be larger than the second one (Fazzari & Peterson 1993): page 334).
We actually ﬁnd out, for the ﬁrms included in the empirical study, a higher
variance for working capital-investment ratio (0.042) than investment over
capital ratio (0.335).
4 Econometric Results
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present our results using the three alternative techniques.
The Random Eﬀects model (RE) allows us to control for some ﬁrms’ speciﬁc
characteristics, what is not possible with the Fixed Eﬀects model (FE). For
instance, we tested whether the ﬁrm belongs to a conglomerate, whether it
is owned by foreign capital or whether it is listed in the New York Stock
Exchange. Since these dummy variables were not signiﬁcant and results
showed no major diﬀerences, results in the table do not include them.14
We run Hausman and Sargan tests as well, which allowed us to select the
most appropriate estimation. The rejection of the ﬁrst test indicates that the
FE models must be chosen, while the rejection of the second one conﬁrms
the correct instrumentalisation of endogenous variables. Since Hausman test
always indicates that FE models are more accurate and results with RE
regression hold, in the sake of simplicity we do not include RE results in
Table 4.
As we can see in Table 3, the cash ﬂow coeﬃcient is always signiﬁcant and
positive for sector exportable ﬁrms, while it is negative for non-exportable
14We controlled using sectoral dummies as well, but we do not include the result on
tables to make them easily readable.
12ﬁrms (though not always signiﬁcant). The eﬀect of lagged sales is signiﬁcant
and positive, working capital is signiﬁcant and negative and Tobin’s Q is
signiﬁcant and positive (unless when we control for endogeneity). Our results
suggest that after controlling for future proﬁtability variables, the cash ﬂow
of a ﬁrm continues to be a crucial determinant of investment suggesting that
exportable ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially constrained. Size variable is almost
always signiﬁcant and positive, even though its coeﬃcient is relatively low.
Finally, the table conﬁrms somewhat the presence of an inverted U-shaped
curve for indebtedness variables: investment has a positive relation with debt
when debt is low, but a negative relation for large debt ratios.
Tables 4 and 5 summarise the estimation of equations 2 and 3, using
the sub-sample of exportable ﬁrms. The fundamental conclusion is that
cash ﬂow is always signiﬁcant and positive, and in both cases results hold
after controlling for future proﬁtability, using both lagged sales and Tobin’s
Q, though this second variable is not robust and usually not signiﬁcant for
IV estimations, i.e. see critics to Tobin’s Q in section 2.1. Cash Flow
coeﬃcient is higher when we use IVFE, a model that is likely to control for
endogeneity problems. In all cases the Sargan test suggests a correct variable
instrumentalisation.
In particular, Table 4 displays estimations of equation 2, where we can see
that, as expected, working capital is signiﬁcant and negative. This conﬁrms
that, as suggested by Fazzari & Peterson (1993), working capital fulﬁls the
role of adjustment variable in order to sustain projected investment amount
by ﬁrms. On the other hand, estimation of equation 3 in Table 5 shows that
liquid assets are positive and signiﬁcant as well, reinforcing our ﬁnancial
constraint hypothesis. Finally, in both cases, indebtedness coeﬃcient has
the expected sign and similar values conﬁrming that, if it is present, the
eﬀect of leverage changes according to the size of the debt ratio.
In short, our results conﬁrm the presence of ﬁnancial constraints on sector
exportable ﬁrms, given that the cash ﬂow coeﬃcient is always signiﬁcant
and positive, even after controlling for future proﬁtability (as represented
by Tobin’s Q and lagged sales). Moreover, since liquid assets and working
capital are both signiﬁcant variables (positive and negative respectively), this
13provides additional support to our hypothesis of frictions in credit market.
Finally, leverage eﬀects can be found but with an inverse U-shaped function
between indebtedness and investment level.
Note that our results hold under alternative empirical models, economet-
ric techniques and variables construction. For instance, following Devereux
& Schiantarelli (1989), we estimate equation 3 in ﬁrst diﬀerences and the
cash ﬂow coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant and positive (with a value of around
0.20). Besides, we run the regressions with a more restrictive deﬁnition of
cash ﬂow (net income after taxes plus depreciation ) and the coeﬃcient is
positive and signiﬁcant. We additionally include lagged investment ratio
along the diﬀerent empirical models and its coeﬃcient is always signiﬁcant
and positive, suggesting a certain path-dependent dynamics. Though since
the other variables’ coeﬃcient remain similar and our objective is not explain
investment but detect the presence of ﬁnancial constraints, we do not include
those results in the tables.
5 Why exportable ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially
constrained in Argentina? Some highlights
and macroeconomic evidence
Together with trade liberalisation, Argentina held a currency board regime
since 1991 that rapidly gave place to a real exchange rate appreciation (par-
tially caused by large capital inﬂows during the period). We argue that
exportable ﬁrms are likely to face deeper ﬁnancial constraints in a context of
recently liberalised economies with a strong currency appreciation.
Two elements of this constraint need to be diﬀerentiated: a) a negative
impact of real exchange appreciation that aﬀects tradable ﬁrms (including of
course all exportable ﬁrms), because of traditional relative price eﬀects; b)
an accentuation of import competition because of trade liberalisation, what
is more likely to aﬀect ﬁrms that are exposed to competition (i.e. tradable
ﬁrms that do not export). Since it is not the case of the ﬁrms analysed in
the present article, we will concentrate in the currency appreciation, which
14aﬀect all tradable ﬁrms and include our exportable deﬁned ﬁrms. We can
eﬀectively observe the unfavourable evolution of relative prices for tradable
ﬁrms in ﬁgure 7, what enhance a process of proﬁt squeeze for those ﬁrms15.
Actually, due to the real exchange appreciation, ﬁrms selling tradable goods
experienced diﬃculties to maintain their proﬁtability levels what diminished
their cash ﬂows.16
As a consequence, balance sheet positions of ﬁrms deteriorated, which
negatively aﬀected their access to external ﬁnance and worsened their in-
vestment capacity. In other words, during the Convertibility period charac-
terised by currency appreciation, ﬁrms from tradable sector had to deal with
both diminishing internal funds as well as a more diﬃcult access to external
ﬁnance (not only in the quantity but also in the conditions to obtain loans
from bank).17
In practice a lender takes into account the future proﬁtability of a bor-
rower at the moment of evaluating its future repayment capacity. In a context
of real exchange appreciation and proﬁt squeeze for tradable ﬁrms, it is logic
for banks to perceive a weakness of potential proﬁts and penalise tradable
ﬁrms with respect to non-tradable ones. Interestingly, we detect this at a
macroeconomic level in Argentinean data in Table 6, where tradable sectors
reduced their weight in bank’s credit distribution to the private sector during
the 1990s.
15The idea that liberalisation process enhances tradable ﬁrms’ proﬁt squeeze have been
veriﬁed by Ros & Lustig (2000) and Ros & Moreno-Brid (2004) for Mexico, a country
that shows several similarities with Argentinean economy during the 1990s, in particular
ﬁnancial liberalisation process and real exchange rate appreciation.
16A complementary support can be found in data presented by Basualdo (2000), where
he analyses relative proﬁtability evolution for aggregate production sectors (of ﬁrst two
hundred ﬁrms). He observes that industrial (T) sectors had been penalised comparing
to service sectors (particularly, recently privatised ﬁrms) and holdings (conglomerates of
diversiﬁed economic activities), both groups enjoy from higher proﬁtability levels. We
argue that, if industrial sectors (T) show a remarkably proﬁt deterioration for larger ﬁrms
(which are likely to be less ﬁnancial constraints), similar situation can be applied to the
rest of Argentinean productive sector.
Besides, Fanelli & Keifman (2002) proved that in Argentina during the nineties non trad-
able ﬁrms were penalised, especially in terms of their access to ﬁnancial markets.
17For broader analysis of peso appreciation consequences over Argentinean economy,
particularly related to an "anti-export" bias on ﬁrms’ investment behaviour, see Bonvecchi
& Porta (2003).
15Finally, we observe the sectoral evolution of investment as an indirect way
of addressing ﬁnancial constraints issues, using imported capital goods as a
proxy for investment.18 Figure 8 conﬁrms our central idea: sector N largely
increased their share of capital goods imports, which grew from 50% in 1991
to around 70% at the end of the decade. The emprical data suggests how
an appreciated exchange rate biases resource allocation in favour of the non-
tradable sector. As clearly explained in Frenkel (2004) such a change in the
productive structure can have medium to long term macroeconomic eﬀects,
especially on the development strategies. Moreover, it can lead to larger
unemployment rates and promote sustained and increasing current account
deﬁcits.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we carried out empirical work using an unbalanced panel built
on balance sheets of 74 large ﬁrms over 40 quarters, covering the Convert-
ibility period in Argentina (1992-2001). We start estimating an investment
equation using three diﬀerent econometric techniques (RE, FEW and IV)
obtaining the following result: exportable ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially con-
strained, as suggested by the positive and signiﬁcant value of their coeﬃcient
representing internal ﬁnance (cash ﬂow estimator). To further explore this
puzzling outcome, we estimate a second set of regressions working only with
a sample of exportable ﬁrms, which conﬁrmes our previous results.
Future research might follow two possible paths. First, our explorative es-
timation calls for a more detailed study of explanations about larger ﬁnancial
constraints for exportable ﬁrms. Second, the analysis needs to be extended
to explore the potential macroeconomic consequences of exportable ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial constraints, especially in relation to Argentina’s historical external
constraints.19
18This is a proxy commonly used in Argentina because: a) there is no direct measure
of capital stock by sector at a macroeconomic level; b) Argentina implemented a dras-
tic process of trade liberalisation and thus investment was largely driven by imports of
machinery and equipment goods
19External constraint notion focuses on Argentinean constant need of foreign exchange
16Indeed, the importance of ﬁnancial constraints becomes even more im-
portant if we take into account the possibility of "ﬁnancial accelerator" mecha-
nisms (Bernanke & Gertler 1989, Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist 1996, Bernanke,
Gertler & Gilchrist 1999). When ﬁrms experience important ﬁnancial con-
straints, an initial shock tends to be reinforced at a ﬁrm level and then
propagated to the macro sphere, which leads to a downturn of aggregate in-
vestment and production. This propagation phenomenon to the economy as
a whole would be deeper the larger is the share of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms
in the economy. Therefore, investment, production and export at aggregate
level will be aﬀected.20
As a consequence, stronger ﬁnancial constraints on exportable sector ﬁrms
would not only reduce investment and production, but also undermine the
capacity of the economy to face eventual external shocks.21 This result is
key to the Argentine economy for two reasons: on the one hand, Argentina
is a country that has suﬀered recurrent balance of payments crises in the
past ﬁfty years (associated to trade deﬁcits) and, on the other hand, the fast
growing external debt during the 1990s has seriously tightened its external
constraints.
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207 Appendix: Tables and Figures
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total 43 47 51 56 58 61 62 64 63 60
Exporting 40 42 42 45 45 48 47 44 43 40
Non-Exporting 3 5 9 11 13 13 15 20 20 20
Table 1: Number of ﬁrms on database per year
Exporting Firms Non-Exporting Firms
median mean median mean
Cash Flow over Capital Stock 4,9% 4,5% 4,9% 6,2%
Investment over Capital Stock 2,2% 3,2% 2,2% 3,7%
Total Debt over Capital Stock 100,4% 110,3% 65,2% 101,1%
Short Term Debt over Total Debt 78,7% 72,4% 47,0% 51,2%
Financial Debt over Total Debt 52,7% 47,4% 73,3% 66,4%
Short term ﬁnancial debt over ﬁnancial debt 72,7% 66,5% 31,0% 40,4%
Liquid Assets over Capital Stock 5,0% 16,8% 2,8% 9,5%
Working Capital over Capital Stock 17,8% 35,0% -6,9% -3,5%
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24Table 3: Baseline model regression: all sample. Equation (1)
Dependent variable Investment over Capital Stock (I-K)
FEW RE IVFE FEW2 RE2 IVFE2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cf-k-t 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.036) (0.019) (0.018) (0.041)
cf-k-nt -.011 -.025∗∗∗ -.041∗∗ -.017∗ -.026∗∗∗ -.023
(0.007) (0.005) (0.018) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016)
dwk-k -.023∗∗∗ -.021∗∗∗ -.036∗∗∗ -.034∗∗∗ -.033∗∗∗ -.037∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
lsales-k 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.019) (0.008) (0.006) (0.02)
size 0.01∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.006 0.004∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009)
debt-k 0.024∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -.057 0.029∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -.041
(0.007) (0.005) (0.043) (0.009) (0.006) (0.032)
debt-k2 -.005∗∗∗ -.004∗∗∗ 0.014 -.007∗∗∗ -.005∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008)
q 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -.002
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.002)
cons 6.217∗∗∗ 7.423 5.257∗∗∗ 7.994
(1.173) (5.741) (1.768) (5.768)
Observations 2069 2069 1188 1440 1440 1106
R2 0.147 0.159
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. ***: Signiﬁcant at 1%. **: Signiﬁcant
at 5%. *: Signiﬁcant at 10%.
25Table 4: Baseline model regression: exportable sector ﬁrms. Equation (2)
Dependent variable Investment over Capital Stock (I-K)
FEW IVFE FEW2 IVFE2 FEW3 IVFE3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cf-k 0.054∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.052) (0.022) (0.068) (0.028) (0.077)
lsales-k 0.033∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.02)
size 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012 0.007 0.019∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.01)
debt-k 0.023∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.02)
debt-k2 -.005∗∗ -.008∗∗∗ -.006∗∗ -.008∗∗ -.009∗∗∗ -.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
dwk-k -.027∗∗∗ -.054∗∗∗ -.034∗∗∗ -.053∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
q 0.002∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
cons 3.288∗∗ 2.771 3.608∗∗∗ 0.609 3.113∗ 0.629
(1.285) (3.562) (1.275) (4.091) (1.845) (4.196)
Observations 1615 1290 1615 978 1172 902
R2 0.109 0.125 0.131
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. ***: Signiﬁcant at 1%. **: Signiﬁcant
at 5%. *: Signiﬁcant at 10%.
26Table 5: Alternative model regression: exportable sector ﬁrms. Equation (3)
Dependent variable Investment over Capital Stock (I-K)
FEW RE IVFE
(1) (2) (3)
cf-k 0.046∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.087)
liqas-k 0.025∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
size1 0.003 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.007) (0.002) (0.009)
q 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.002)
debt-k 0.032∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.011) (0.007) (0.019)




Observations 1181 1181 921
R2 0.125
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. ***: Signiﬁcant at 1%. **: Signiﬁcant
at 5%. *: Signiﬁcant at 10%.
27Figure 7: Consumption Price Index/ Producer Price Index (proxy of Non-
tradable Sector Price /Tradable Sector Price)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INDEC data, Argentina.
Table 6: Distribution of bank loans to private sector (excluding household)
1991-2001 (%)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data of Argentinean Central Bank
(BCRA).
28Source: Authors’ calculation based on data of Argentinean Ministry of
Economy
Non-tradable sectors include: Electricity; Gas and Water; Construction;
Retailed Trade, Bank and Insurances; Communications; Health; Research.
Figure 8: Capital Goods Imports by Sectors. (%)
29